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The Presidentialization of Political Parties in the Federal Republic of Germany 
Charles Lees  
 
Introduction 
Germany is a parliamentary system but is an interesting case in the context of this 
volume because it raises the possibility, acknowledged by Samuels and Shugart, that 
Germany might be one of the instances in which we could find ‘presidentialized 
features’ (2010, p. 16) in a parliamentary system. The reason for this is that the 
degree of executive authority the Basic Law invests in the post of Chancellor under 
Germany’s system of Chancellor Democracy (Mayntz, 1980) constitutes a different 
kind of relationship between the party as Principal and the Chief Executive as Agent. 
Nevertheless, as this chapter will reveal, the power of the Chancellor is not fully 
institutionalized but is rather contingent on the individual Chancellor’s political 
skillset and subsequent ability to control the Executive and his or her own party. 
Thus, in as far as we can ‘apply’ the concept of presidentialization to the German 
case, it is as a potential outlier along the distribution of parliamentary systems rather 
than as a bone fide exception to the rule that ‘party  behavior and organization will 
tend to mimic constitutional structure’ (Samuels and Shugart, 2010, p. 15).  
In terms of control over the Core Executive, the Basic Law stipulates that 
individual cabinet ministers are responsible to the Chancellor rather than to the 
Bundestag, and the principle of ‘guidelines competence’ (Richtlinienkompetenz) 
bestowed on the Chancellor does much to maintain the steering capacity of the 
government and buttress the power enjoyed by the largest party within the executive. 
These formal executive powers also help with the messier business of inter- party and 
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intra-party management in the legislature. In terms of processes of leadership, the 
long-established practices and norms around Chancellor Democracy shape the 
balance of power within the Core Executive, between the Executive and the 
Legislature, and also between the Chancellor and his or her own party. And with 
regard to styles of leadership, the particular emphasis on the Chancellor in German 
politics naturally also focuses attention on the leading candidates (often misleadingly 
referred to as ‘Chancellor candidates’) fielded by the two main catch-all parties, the 
center-right CDU/CSU and the center-left SPD. Thus there is not only an a priori 
bias towards some degree of personalization of party campaigning as a result but also 
a greater focus on the Chancellor candidates than on the leadership candidates of the 
other main parties, the free-market FDP, the Greens, and the Left Party. But 
personalization is not presidentalization. 
So, in the German case, there is a degree of congruence between the kind of 
empirics associated with Chancellor Democracy and what we would expect to find 
under conditions of presidentialization. However, to be able to isolate and understand 
the differences we need to keep in mind that unlike the idea of presidentialization, 
which is explicitly intended to be a comparative tool, the notion of Chancellor 
Democracy is premised on sui generis aspects of the German political system. As 
Karl-Rudolf Korte points out ‘the peculiarity of the political decision-making process 
in the parliamentary system of the German Federal Republic becomes obvious if the 
political system is described as a parliamentary governmental system with chancellor 
hegemony. The negotiation pact between government and parliamentary majority is 
distinctive through a strong and constitutionally secured [my italics] chancellor 
system’ (2000, p. 5). And so, whilst the notion of presidentialization is a dynamic 
concept premised upon generalized observations about contingent processes that 
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could take place in almost any polity with a de jure or de facto separation of powers, 
Chancellor Democracy is a more static notion based upon specific assumptions about 
strongly embedded dynamics that are peculiar in many ways to the Federal Republic 
of Germany. 
 
Constitutional features and party presidentialization in Germany 
For historical reasons, the constitutional order of the Federal Republic of Germany 
after its establishment in 1949 was designed to constrain the concentration of power; 
be it within a particular territorial unit, arena of politics, arm of government, or in the 
hands of a single individual. However, political scientists have identified centripetal 
forces at work within the constitution that encourage what Gordon Smith (1986) 
called a ‘politics of centrality’.  
Germany is a federal state, made up of sixteen constituent states that are 
represented federally through the territorial chamber, the Bundesrat. The lower house 
is the Bundestag, to which members are directly elected through a Mixed Member 
Proportional (MMP) electoral system. The MMP system combines a plurality-based 
first vote for constituency-based candidates and a proportional second vote for state-
based party-list candidates. The party list system favors party elites who draw up the 
lists and allows them to reward loyalty and adherence to the party line (Lees, 2005). 
There are relatively low levels of district magnitude but the level of 
disproportionality has risen since German Unification, adding to the centralizing 
dynamics within the system (Ibid.). The Federal electoral system is not exactly 
replicated across the constituent states, where systems of seat allocation may differ 
and, taken in the round, we must conclude that the German electoral system(s) at all 
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levels presents a distinct mix of incentives and constraints that shape the party 
system, favors certain actors within it, and shapes the Principal-Agent relationship 
between party and Chief Executive. So, on the one hand, the system was designed to 
prevent one- or two-party dominance and also to preserve a strong territorial link 
between electors and elected, both objectives that are antithetical to 
presidentialization. On the other, aspects of the electoral system - such as the 5 per 
cent threshold hurdle to representation and the allocation of ‘surplus votes’ 
(Űberhangsmandaten) – are designed to shut out extremist parties, prevent party 
system fragmentation, and encourage centripetal political competitioni. 
Beyond the electoral system, the German federal system itself also presents a 
similar mix. In his comparative study of federations, Alfred Stepan places Germany 
midway along a 'demos constraining-demos enabling' continuum (2001; Lees, 2002), 
which is determined along four dimensions: (1) the degree of territorial over-
representation, (2) the ‘policy scope’ of the second chamber, (3) the degree to which 
policy making is constitutionally allocated to supermajorities or to subunits of the 
federation, and (4) the degree to which the party system is polity-wide in its 
orientation and incentive systems. The Bundesrat displays a significant degree of 
territorial overrepresentation, with all German states holding between three and six 
votes. This prevents the concentration of power within the larger, more populous 
states and their state-level parties. By contrast, the degree of 'policy scope' exercised 
by the Bundesrat is fairly modest although the Bundestag increasingly requires the 
Bundesrat’s assent in those instances where legislation has a European dimension 
that touches upon state competencies (Jeffery, 1994). As Ludger Helms (2005, p. 
436) points out, the extent to which the Bundesrat can actually hold up legislative 
business is dependent on whether or not the opposition parties control the territorial 
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chamber. And as this is often the case, the center is constrained because it is forced 
into a de facto coalition with the party that controls the Bundesrat. To balance this, 
Stepan (2001) identifies more centralizing tendencies elsewhere. Thus, Germany is 
only modestly placed in terms of the degree to which policy making is 
constitutionally allocated to supermajorities or to subunits of the federation, and 
Article 31 of the Basic Law makes it clear that 'Federal law shall take precedence 
over Land law'. Finally, Germany ranks highly in terms of the degree to which the 
party system is polity-wide in its orientation and incentive systems. Polity-wide 
parties control nearly all of the seats in the Bundestag and Bundesrat and, although 
these centralizing tendencies are somewhat offset by the presence of alternative 
power- and resource-bases in the state-level parties, party elites are able to exert a 
high degree of party discipline over their members throughout the Republic. 
The most specific constitutional constraint, however, lies in the Federal 
Republic’s constitutionally-codified party and election laws. In the Political Parties 
Act, known as the ParteienGii, Articles 6 to 16 on internal organization, and Article 
17 on the nomination of candidates, are most relevant to this study. Article 7 decrees 
that parties ‘are subdivided into regional organizations. The size and scope of these 
units are determined in the statutes. The regional structure of the party must be 
developed to a sufficient degree to enable individual members to participate to a 
suitable extent in the forming of political opinions within the party [my italics]’ 
(ParteienG, 1994, p. 5) whilst Article 9 declares that ‘assemblies of members or 
delegates (convention, general assembly) constitute the supreme organ in a given 
regional organization’ (Ibid, pp. 5-6) and Article 17 states that ‘candidates for 
election to parliament must be chosen by secret ballot’ (Ibid, p. 9). 
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In the Federal Election Law, or BGW, the articles that are especially relevant 
to this volume are Articles 20.2 and 27.1 which state that constituency nominations 
and list nominations respectively ‘must bear the […] signatures of the Land party 
organization or […] of the executive committees of the next lower regional 
organisations [my italics] (1996, pp. 9 and 12) and Article 21, which stipulates that 
constituency candidates can only be selected by ‘an assembly of party members […] 
or in a special or general assembly of party representatives’ (Ibid, p. 10). Article 27 
also makes it clear that individuals can only be nominated in one Land and only 
appear in one Land list (Ibid, p. 12). 
The framework established by the ParteienG and the BGW sets out quite 
narrow parameters for party and electoral organization that embed the rights of 
ordinary party members within a Weberian rational-legal framework built around the 
regional party organization, which is defined as either the Land party or, crucially, 
the next lower tier of organization. This is a clear a priori political and organizational 
check on centralization and also a guarantee that a certain degree of inclusiveness 
should operate within all German political parties. In addition, the emphasis on 
members’ or delegates’ assemblies and secret ballots removes a good deal of 
discretion from parties in terms of the kind of innovative and/or plebiscitary modes 
of candidate selection that are available to them. This raises two points of note. First, 
these constitutional arrangements not only constrain German political parties in 
comparison to parties in some other polities but also limit the potential for divergence 
between them. Second, it demonstrates how presidentialization is shaped by the 
constitutional features of individual polities: in this case limiting both the extent and 
degree of variance of its overall impact. 
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The genetic features of German parties 
The genetic features of the mainstream parties in the German party system are 
defined as those parties that survived the period of party system concentration up to 
1961 – i.e. the CDU and CSU, SPD, and FDP – as well as the two parties that 
emerged later, the Greens and the Left Party. All of these parties have significant 
experience of government office at the level of the constituent states and, with the 
exception of the Left Party, have also participated in Federal government. Although 
all six parties are covered, I pay particular attention to the two Catch-all parties, the 
CDU and SPD, as they are the two formateuer parties in the Federal party system and 
all Federal Chancellors to date have come from within their ranks. In the coverage I 
refer to the book’s framework of internal versus external origins, penetration versus 
diffusion organizational forms, the extent of charismatic leadership, and the notion of 
cohesive dominant versus fragmented internal coalitions. 
 
The CDU 
The CDU’s genesis took place during the period of Allied occupation between 1945 
and 1949 as it emerged as a ‘mass-based denominational party’ (Kirchheimer, 1966), 
characterized by an incremental religious-based ideology, crosscut by the influence 
of clerics and other religious and social thinkers, a relatively open membership, and 
an acceptance of democracy. Although supported by the US Occupation Forces at the 
time, the CDU has internal origins and no external sponsor. 
The CDU is very much part of the family of Christian Democratic parties 
found in countries such as Italy, Belgium, Austria, the Netherlands. Like those parties 
it was grounded in the specific conditions of post-1945 Europe and had as its  
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mission to defend bourgeois democracy against leftist parties at home and the Soviet 
Union internationally, whilst encouraging regional integration as a buttress against 
both. Although there are small ‘German nationalist’ and ‘Christian Social’ tendencies 
within the party, the internal coalition that emerged around Adenauer is still cohesive 
and dominant today. 
The CDU emerged through a process of territorial diffusion, with a 
membership drawn from ‘a complex variety of groups with extremely varied 
backgrounds in terms of their pre-Hitler party affiliation’ (Heidenheimer, 1960, p. 
30). It was built around state-level parties run by local notables who controlled 
membership and, after 1949, funds and communications with the new Federal capital 
in Bonn. There was an intense rivalry between these regions that led to the eventual 
organizational division between the CDU and the CSU, as well as the establishment 
of Adenauer's hegemonic position within the CDU itself. 
The role of Adenauer in particular means that the CDU’s internal governance 
was shaped by a culture of charismatic leadership, albeit constrained by the need to 
bargain with other organizational power bases, particularly in the Land parties. In the 
early decades of the Federal Republic, the CDU and its sister party the CSU were 
considered little more than a so-called ‘association for electing the Chancellor’ 
(Kanzlerwahlverein) and, by the time the CDU/CSU went into opposition in 1969, 
the CDU’s original membership of over 400,000 had more than halved. The need to 
modernize the party was made even more apparent by a perceived loss of political 
initiative to the SPD, which had embraced the catch-all model and developed a more 
professionalized and centralized mode of party governance. In response to the need 
to modernize, the CDU’s Federal Executive and Federal Committee were given 
enhanced powers, the party’s General Secretary assumed a policy function to match 
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the post’s co-ordination duties, and party finance and budget lines were restructured. 
So successful were these reforms that, when the CDU returned to government in 
1982, it had an efficient party machine and had boosted its membership to over 
750,000 (Padgett and Burkett, 1986, p. 107). Once in power after 1982, Helmut Kohl 
and his ministers re-asserted their dominance over the party machine and Kohl’s own 
influence eventually grew to the kind of levels of personal power enjoyed by 
Adenauer in the 1950s.  
The electoral defeat of Kohl in 1998 was the catalyst for another burst of 
party reform, first under the short-lived reign of Wolfgang Schauble and more 
markedly under the current party leader and Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel. 
Merkel epitomizes the CDU’s evolution away from the mass-based denominational 
party type, being the first female and Protestant CDU leader. Nevertheless, the basic 
pattern established in the early years of the Federal Republic of a territorially 
diffused, internally driven party with some history of charismatic leadership and a 
cohesive dominant coalition remains in place today. 
 
X. 3.2. The SPD 
The genetic features of the SPD were shaped by the impact of the merger of the 
General German Workers’ Assembly (ADAV) or ‘Lassaleans’ and the Social 
Democratic Workers’ Party (SDAP) or ‘Eisenachers’ in the late 19th century. The 
party has historic links with the German trades union movement but not to the extent 
that the unions could be classified as an external sponsor.  
The outcome of the ideological struggle between the highly organized 
Lassaleans and their Eisenacher rivals was a unified party that emerged through a 
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process of territorial diffusion. Nevertheless, the de facto dominance of the 
Lassaleans in the new party meant that the diffusional effects were offset by 
centralizing tendencies, so although formal authority was invested in the party 
congress in fact the executive committee of the party secretariat exercised real day-
to-day power (Kirchheimer, 1966). As Hunt observes, ‘from its outset the German 
labour movement has a dual heritage in organisational as well as in political matters 
[…] two sharply contrasting models of organisation: the one authoritarian, rigidly 
centralised, efficient, and disciplined, the other ultra-democratic, loosely federalist in 
structure, and lax in discipline. In the subsequent history of the Social Democratic 
Party – and even after it moved away from the class-mass model in the 1950s - one 
can follow the interplay of these two clashing concepts of organisation’ (1964, pp. 6-
7).  
As a result the SPD has been prone to challenges to the dominant coalition. 
The first, successful, challenge to and change of the internal coalition took place 
through the 1950s and culminated in the adoption of the Bad Godesberg programme 
of 1959, and was driven by two political factors. The first was the so-called ‘enforced 
merger’ (Zwangsvereinigung) in 1946 between the faction of the SPD in the Russian 
zone of occupation, led by Otto Grotewohl, and the communist KPD. The new 
‘Socialist Unity Party’ (Sozialistisches Einheitspartei Deutschland, or SED) evolved 
quickly into a proto-hegemonic Leninist party that the SPD subsequently defined 
itself against. The second factor was the run of election defeats for the SPD in 1949, 
1953 and 1957. These external shocks eventually forced an ideological and 
generational change of leadership. Willy Brandt, a former Governing Mayor of 
Berlin, became SPD leader and was nominated as the party’s leading candidate in 
1960, assuming a stronger personal profile that complemented the process of 
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ideological moderation associated with the newly dominant ‘new socialist’ coalition 
around the right wing of the SPD.  
The second, less successful, challenge to the dominant coalition arose in the 
1970s and was driven by an influx of young members with New Left or New Politics 
orientations who expressed their frustration at the SPD’s moderate course in the 
1970s and 1980s. This led to a period of internal debate in the party and the eventual 
adoption of the 1989 Basic Programme, which included significant post-materialist 
elements within it. However, the New Left never fully dislodged the SPD Right and 
the party’s ultimate failure either to suppress or, alternatively, integrate the New Left 
drove the emergence and eventual consolidation of the Greens as a significant rival 
on the left of the German party system (Lees, 2000). 
The SPD has no culture of charismatic leadership, although there has been an 
increased personalization of politics over time. Brandt, and to some extent his 
successor Helmut Schmidt, and after 1998 Gerhard Schröder all pursued a 
personalized and non-ideological leadership style that often sidelined formal party 
structures and processes. It was only after the defeat of Schröder in 2005 – and with 
no obviously charismatic successor in sight – that a more collective style of 
leadership re-asserted itself in the SPD, albeit centered within a small party elite.  
 
The CSU, FDP, Left Party, and Greens 
The CSU shares the same genetic features as the CDU but, unlike its larger sister 
party, the CSU has never explicitly aspired to develop a cross-confessional appeal. It 
can be characterized as the extreme result of territorial diffusion, internally driven, 
with some history of charismatic leadership during the era of Franz-Josef Strauss and 
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a reasonably cohesive dominant coalition built around a distinct policy mix of 
economic modernization embedded in a narrative of Bavarian values (sometimes 
described as the doctrine of the ‘laptop and lederhosen’). The only area of 
contestation is around the domain of Europe, where some elements of the CSU have 
developed a ‘soft Eurosceptic’ position (Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2002; Lees, 2002). 
Although coming from very different political spaces, the FDP and the Left 
Party are both what Gunther and Diamond would describe as classic programmatic 
parties (2003; Lees, 2005). Both have relatively clear-cut ideological profiles and 
occupy niche positions with the party system, in which the FDP focuses on a clear 
pro-market and ‘western’ message whilst the Left Party mobilizes a strongly left-of-
center and overwhelmingly ‘eastern’ social milieu. Both parties are dominated by 
their elites but whilst the FDP leadership has in recent years lacked a public profile, 
key members of the Left Party’s leadership, such as Gregor Gysi or Oskar 
Lafontaine, have enjoyed high levels of national recognition. Both parties also have a 
clearly defined social base although the means by which these links are organized 
differ.  
The FDP emerged and evolved under the post-1949 MMP electoral system in 
the ‘old’ West Germany through a process of territorial diffusion and without an 
external sponsor. It has relatively narrow social links, a small party membership, and 
a relatively ‘thin’ and elite dominated party organization but no real culture of 
charismatic leadership. It has a dominant and cohesive coalition based around 
relatively free market policies but has undergone two successful challenges to the 
dominant coalition in the past. In 1968, when the ‘social liberal faction’ ousted the 
previously dominant ‘national liberal’ faction, which led in turn to the replacement of 
the incumbent leader Erich Mende by Walter Scheel. This change paved the way for 
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the FDP to enter into coalition with the SPD the following year. The second change 
took place in the late 1970s and early 1980s, a process in which the ‘social liberals’ 
shifted their positions rightwards and, in terms of personnel, were also replaced in 
some key posts by ‘economic liberals’. Again, this led to the possibility of the FDP 
entering a new government coalition – this time led by the CDU/CSU. The FDP can 
be described as an internally-driven party, which emerged through a process of 
territorial diffusion, with no history of charismatic leadership, and is governed 
internally by a cohesive dominant coalition built around pro-business and free-market 
values. 
The Left Party is harder to classify. On the one hand, when the PDS emerged 
in 1990 it was definitely not a party of territorial diffusion, as it inherited the 
organization and assets of the highly penetrative SED. On the other hand, after its 
renaming as the Left Party and the subsequent merger with the more ‘west German’ 
Electoral Alternative for Labour and Social Justice (WASG) in 2006/2007, it is now 
very much a party of territorial diffusion and has no external sponsor. There is a 
relatively dominant coalition, based upon a ‘democratic socialist’ agenda, although 
the party retains some of the more anti-democratic elements that made up the SED. 
In addition, it is worth remembering that WASG emerged from those elements of the 
SPD left that rejected the strongly reformist course charted by Schröder’s Red-Green 
coalition and has a somewhat different temperament to the former PDS, despite 
sharing nominally similar ideological positions (Lees et al., 2010). Nevertheless, the 
Left Party as it is now constituted can be described as an internally driven party, 
which emerged through a process of territorial diffusion, albeit centered 
geographically in the new Federal states of the former East Germany, with no history 
of charismatic leadership (despite the name recognition of Gysi or Lafontaine) and is 
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governed internally by a cohesive dominant coalition built around a program of 
democratic socialism. 
Finally, the Greens’ genetic features make it the paradigmatic example of a 
left-libertarian ecological party, emerging out of the ‘citizens initiative’ groups of the 
1970s in response to the SPD’s failure to respond effectively to the challenge of the 
New Politics agenda. To some extent, the Greens had an external sponsor in the 
wider environmental and peace movements and they were a product of self-conscious 
territorial diffusion, with a strong emphasis on the distinct identity of local party 
organizations, many of which retained their own distinct names form many years 
after the establishment of the national party organization. In addition, the emergent 
party underwent a process of profound ideological struggle before a dominant 
coalition emerged, first between the movement’s ‘New Left’ and ‘value 
conservative’ strands and, subsequently, when the New Left had won that particular 
struggle, between its the hardline ‘Fundi’ and more pragmatic ‘Realo’ wings; a 
process that ended when the moderate ‘Aufbruch’ group formed a centrist dominant 
coalition with the Realos (Markovits and Gorski, 1993, pp. 192-7). These ideological 
struggles had organizational consequences as the Greens transformed itself from a 
movement-based ‘anti-party party’ - as Petra Kelly famously described the party - 
into a far more professionalized organization (Lees, 2000) in which the wider 
movement as external sponsor diminished in importance to the point that the party 
became to all intents and purposes internally driven. Organizational issues that 
became enmeshed in the ideological struggle included the principles of ‘rotation’, a 
form of delegation democracy in which elected list members were expected to step 
down from parliament after one term, and ‘basis democracy’ (Basisdemokratie), 
which endowed the party membership with relatively high levels of formal control 
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over the parliamentary faction. Both of these principles were designed to impair the 
professionalization of the party and prevent or at least slow the emergence of the 
cadre of career politicians found in the other parties. Over time both of these issues 
were resolved in favor of the forces of professionalization and this was accelerated 
by both the impact of German Unification, which saw the ‘western’ Greens merge 
with the more moderate Alliance ‘90 and ‘eastern’ Greens, and also the consolidation 
of the Greens’ position in the Bundestag, which spurred a sustained transfer of 
resources and power from the ‘party in the country’ to the parliamentary party. 
Today, we can describe the Greens as an internally-driven party, which emerged 
through a process of territorial diffusion, with no history of charismatic leadership, 
and is governed internally by a cohesive dominant coalition built around a moderate 
program of left-libertarian and ecologist policies. 
 
X. 4. The level of centralized party leadership and its changes 
In terms of the degree of centralized party leadership, there are distinct principles and 
practices in the management of executive governance and executive-legislature 
relations that are embedded within the notion of Chancellor Democracy (Mayntz, 
1980) but there is little evidence that the impact of these principles and practices have 
intensified, at least in terms of management of the core executive. On the one hand, 
the Chancellor’s resource base has been enhanced over time and the number of staff 
in the Chancellor’s office grew substantially from around 150 during the Adenauer 
Chancellorship to over 500 under Kohl (Blondel and Müller-Rommel, 1993), making 
it the biggest such ‘office’ in Europe. At the same time, in the 20 years until 2005 
there had been no evidence of a significant increase in the number of political and 
policy advisors in the Chancellor’s Office and, indeed, the number of such advisors 
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declined after the defeat of Kohl in 1998. In addition, a Planning Directorate set up 
by Schröder after 1998 was disbanded after his second electoral victory in 2002 
(Helms, 2005, pp. 434-5).  
Attempts to promote or favor outsiders within the core executive have also 
been largely unsuccessful. Thus, whilst Schröder did have an inner circle or ‘kitchen 
cabinet’, the key figures, such as Steinmeier (the Chief of the Cabinet Office) or 
Schilly (the ex-Green who became an SPD member and Interior Minister), were 
drawn from the formal Weberian structures of government and enjoyed power bases 
in their own right. In addition, subsequent attempts to place non-partisan ‘experts’ at 
center stage have floundered on either the needs of coalition building after the 
election (Merkel’s failed attempt to promote Paul Kirchhof in 2005) or a failure to 
enter office in the first place (Steinmeier’s unsuccessful championing of Harald 
Christ in 2009). In addition, although the Schröder governments (1998-2005) often 
outsourced policy formulation to ‘independent’ commissions outside the formal 
machinery of government (Lees, 2000), this was not a new practice and dated back to 
the setting up of the ‘Council of Economic Advisors’ in the 1960s. Indeed, rather 
than being seen as a symptom or even an instrument of presidentialization, 
Schröder’s instinct to outsource policy formulation could be regarded as the opposite: 
namely a strategy of consensual or ‘big tent’ politics that is in many ways antithetical 
to the process of presidentialization as it is understood as independent from the party 
and its dynamics.  
If the evidence of increasing presidentialization within the core executive is 
mixed, there is little evidence that the Chancellor’s management of executive-
legislative relations has become more presidentialized either. A long-standing 
convention such as that of the ‘constructive vote of no confidence’ buttresses the 
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position of the Chancellor vis-à-vis the legislature. Moreover, under normal 
circumstances the key to the Chancellor’s management of the Bundestag is to be 
found in its relationship with and control over its own party, whilst the relationship 
between Bundestag and Bundesrat is in part dependent on the electoral cycle in the 
constituent states and, ceteris paribus, tends to constrain the concentration of power 
in the center (Lees, 2005). The one recent exception to the rule has been the impact 
of the Euro crisis and Merkel’s skill in framing the crisis as ‘the Chancellor’s 
business’ (Kanzlersache); a move which short-circuited the normal dynamic of co-
operation between the Chancellor’s Office, the Foreign Ministry, which was led by 
Guido Westerwelle from the junior FDP, and the Finance Ministry, led by Merkel’s 
CDU colleague and rival, Schauble (Lees, 2012). However, this is consistent with 
what we know about Europeanization and how it privileges the core executive versus 
the legislature and also party elites vis-à-vis the membership (Carter and Poguntke, 
2010; Ladrech, 2007) more than any prima facie evidence of presidentialization. 
The extent of leadership autonomy within party organizations can be defined 
as the extent to which Chancellors have been able to govern past as opposed to 
through their respective parties. Once again, the analytical basis of this notion is 
distinct but the empirics of this dimension of presidentialization (personalization) are 
harder to differentiate from long-standing practices of Chancellor democracy. In his 
analysis of the dynamic between the roles of government leader and party leader, 
Arnold Heidenheimer posited a fourfold typology that tried to capture the public 
presentation of this dynamic. The four types were: (1) government and party leader; 
(2) government and party leader; (3) government (and party) leader; and (4) 
government-party leader (1961, p. 249). Curiously, at the time that Heidenheimer 
was writing, there had only been Chancellor Adenauer. Helms provides another 
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fourfold categorization to describe the internal relationship between the Chancellor 
and his/her party: (1) autonomous, in which the party is used as an instrument; (2) 
neutral, in that the Chancellor is neither the principal nor the agent of the party; (3) 
dependent on the party for authority and/or resources; and (4) detached and 
indifferent to the party (Ibid, p. 148).  
Helms went on to place seven German Chancellors, from Adenauer to 
Schöder, based on the internal and external dynamics of the relationships between 
them and their parties. I have added my own judgmental categorization of Merkel. 
The most common category is autonomous/government and party leader, which 
includes Adenuer (CDU), Schröder (SPD), and Merkel (CDU) (Clemens, 2011, 
2007; Patzelt, 2006). The second most common is that of detached/government (and 
party) leader, which includes Ludwig Erhard (CDU) and Helmut Schmidt (SPD). 
Then we have autonomous/government (and party) leader, which accurately 
describes Kohl (CDU) and – to a much lesser extent I would argue – also captures 
some of the political style of Schröder (SPD). Finally, Willie Brandt (SPD) falls into 
the categories of neutral/government and party leader and to a lesser extent 
autonomous/government and party leader, whilst Kurt Kiesinger (CDU) falls into the 
category of neutral/government and party leader. 
However, there does not appear to be any party-political dimension to this 
categorization, with CDU and SPD Chancellors in all three of the most common 
categorizations (1) autonomous/government and party leader, (2) 
detached/government (and party) leader, and (3) autonomous/government (and party) 
leader). Scholars of the political biographies of these politicians might note that there 
is a tendency for SPD Chancellors (and, indeed, SPD Chancellor-candidates) to 
emerge from state-level politics, with Brandt cutting his political teeth as Governing 
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Mayor of the City-State of Berlin, Schröder formerly a Minister-President of the 
State of Lower Saxony, and Schmidt originally an Interior Minister in the City-State 
of Hamburg. This contrasts with some CDU Chancellors like Erhard, Kiesinger, and 
Merkel, who came up through the Bundestag ranks but, then again, Adenauer, 
Erhard, and Kohl emerged out of state-level politics in the Rhineland. So we can 
discern no pattern beyond what we know about the skill sets of the politicians 
involved. 
 
The Presidentialization of parties 
In terms of the degree of autonomy exercised by the leadership vis-à-vis the party, 
Adenauer, Brandt, Schmidt, Kohl, Schröder, and Merkel are relatively ‘strong’ 
Chancellors but there have also been the two ‘weaker’ Chancellorships of Ludwig 
Erhard (CDU, 1963 to 1966) and Kiesinger (CDU, 1966-69). The explanations for 
these two weak Chancellorships can be found in either the narrative of relative 
political skillsets or in the systemic context in which they operated, but if we look at 
the record of the current Chancellor, Merkel, she has operated very effectively in a 
relatively symmetrical Grand Coalition with the SPD as junior partner between 2005 
and 2009 and also under what were for her benign conditions of asymmetry in 
coalition with the FDP as junior partner between 2009 and 2013 (Clemens, 2011; 
Williarty, 2008; Thompson and Lennartz, 2007).  
Moving on to the increased use of plebiscitary mechanisms of communication 
and mobilization, and a related reliance on personal charisma and mandates, the 
chapter has demonstrated at some length that the degree of discretion available to 
German political parties in this regard is narrow. Nevertheless, all of the parties with 
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the exception of the CSU have enacted statutory reforms to allow members to initiate 
membership ballots on policy issues and, to a lesser extent, organizational questions 
and the SPD has even used membership ballots at the land level to elect their 
candidates for Minister-President (in the states of Schleswig-Holstein and Lower 
Saxony in 2011). In addition, the SPD and FDP have provisions for plebiscites to be 
initiated from above on organizational matters. As Detterbeck observes, it is unclear 
whether these measures have been designed to shore up the elites by disempowering 
mid-level party activists or are genuinely intended to ‘let the members back in’ 
(2013, pp. 271-2). What we do not see accompanying these changes, however, is an 
increase in charismatic and personalized appeals. German politics remains very much 
an elite driven exercise with deals done behind closed doors rather than through 
appeals to the grassroots, and there remains a strong and historically grounded 
suspicion of populism and appeals to personal mandates that short-circuit the 
established rational-legal machinery of party governance. 
So where does this leave the overall balance of power across the two 
dimensions of the party selectorates in Germany? Figure xxx sets out what we know 
about the party selectorate in German political parties today. 
 
Figure xxx about here 
 
Figure xxx demonstrates that German political parties are clustered towards the 
center of both dimensions of the selectorate. Moreover, with two exceptions along 
the dimension of exclusiveness, this is by-and-large where the parties have been 
located throughout the history of the Federal Republic. De jure power remains with 
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delegates to party assemblies, although this is often an ex post rubber-stamp exercise, 
as de facto power is wielded by the party elites, particularly when it comes to the 
selection of leading candidates (Lübker, 2002). The two exceptions noted above are 
those in which the Greens and the SPD have redistributed power towards the 
ordinary party members in recent years. For readers who are acculturated into unitary 
state politics this may not seem that important but, in the context of federal states 
such as Germany – and given that the SPD’s leading candidates at the national level 
normally emerge from state-level politics – this is quite significant. Of more obvious 
importance, however, was the Greens decision to allow the membership in 2012 to 
elect their joint national ticket for the 2013 Federal election. This truly was a break 
from the norm of German politics and very much in keeping with – and almost a 
throwback to - the party’s genesis as a movement-based anti-party party. 
On the second dimension of centralization, the CDU and CSU are more 
centralized than the other political parties; albeit for different reasons. In many ways 
the CDU has travelled the furthest along this dimension from its original starting 
point. There is no doubt that the CDU has a strong tradition of state-level politics but, 
unlike the SPD, many of its leaders emerged out of federal-level politics in the 
Bundestag and the combined CDU/CSU party parliamentary group wields a great 
deal of influence over state-level politics. The same is at least as true of the CSU but 
here, given the regional nature of the party’s organization, it is hard to locate the 
party on the Hazan–Rahat scale. The CSU has not reformed its modes of internal 
democracy and is not known for its vibrant culture of internal debate. In short the 
CSU is at least as centralized as the CDU, but this cannot be adequately placed on a 
national-local scale. For all of the mainstream parties in Germany, the framework 
established by the ParteienG and the BGW lends a counter-weight to the pull of 
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national politics, although the cartelization of the German party system has had an 
impact and the ‘national’ party organizations, buttressed by the generous resources 
available to registered parliamentary groups. Thus, they have all travelled to some 
extent along this dimension towards greater centralization. 
 
X.6. Conclusion 
This chapter has demonstrated that many of the features of Chancellor Democracy 
may under some circumstances resemble those we might expect from 
presidentialization, but they are contingent rather than the permanent features found 
in true presidentalized regimes. Thus, Germany is a relative outlier within the 
distribution of parliamentary systems rather than a true exception. 
It less clear to what extent our intervening variable – as per the book’s 
framework - the genetic features of German political parties, plays a role in 
determining the extent of presidentalization. One reason for this is that we do not see 
a great deal of variance across the categories used. The mainstream parties in 
Germany possess distinct genetic features and have also all undergone processes of 
organizational development and change (ranging from often quite gradual processes 
of professionalization to more sudden institutional junctures, including party 
mergers, re-launches and renamings) that have blurred these features. There are more 
commonalities than differences. All of the parties (even the Left Party) have internal 
versus external origins and diffusional rather than penetrational organizational forms. 
With the exception of the CDU/CSU, there is no tradition of charismatic leadership 
and, with the exception of the CDU/CSU and the Left Party, each has undergone 
some degree of change in the composition of internal coalitions. Thus, the SPD saw 
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one total change in the dominant coalition during the 1950s and a challenge and 
partial change of coalition through the contestation of the New Politics in the 1970s 
and 1980s. The FDP saw two changes in coalition, one during the 1960s and one in 
the late 1970s and early 1980s. And the Greens saw two changes to the dominant 
coalition; first, when the New Left marginalized the value conservatives and, second, 
when the centrist Aufbruch group ended the period of ideological struggle between 
the Realos and the Fundis. All of the mainstream parties are dominated by reasonably 
coherent coalitions: the CDU/CSU by a moderate right-of-center and broadly pro-
European (less so in the CSU) coalition, the SPD by a coalition supporting a 
moderate left-of-center program with some post-materialist elements, the FDP by its 
economic liberal tendency, the Left Party by its democratic socialist and (broadly-
speaking) eastern mainstream, and the Greens by a pragmatic left-libertarian and 
(very light green) ecologist coalition. 
Moreover, although there have been small shifts in the distribution of power 
across the two dimensions of the party selectorate, the overall distribution remains 
reasonably constant across time and across parties. The legal framework of German 
politics does not bestow a great deal of organizational discretion on German parties 
and German politics remains dominated by a political class that distrusts charismatic 
and/or populist means of organization and mobilization and prefers a statecraft 
defined by elite compromise and embedded within the comfort blanket of Weberian 
rational-legal authority. Germany remains a ‘parliamentary governmental system 
with chancellor hegemony’ (Korte, 2000, 5). Whether this amounts to what is 
understood in the comparative politics literature as presidentialization remains a 
matter for debate. 
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Notes 
 
 
                                                        
i In addition, the Federal Constitutional Court has acted to curb the activities of or 
even outlaw extremist parties of the right and left. Court rulings outlawed the Neo-
Nazi Socialist Reich Party (SRP) in October 1952 and the Communist Party of 
Germany (KPD) in August 1956. 
ii The PartienG establishes the constitutional status of parties, their definition in legal 
terms, and sets out laws on internal organisation (including statutes and programmes, 
members and delegates assemblies, members’ rights, arbitration, and managing 
regional organisations), nomination of candidates for election, as well as public 
financing, presentation of accounts. 
